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INTRODUCTION

N keeping with the approach we adopted in 2000, this Survey will

review the Texas court decisions' from the previous year 2 that we3
believe are most relevant to the practice of corporate law in Texas.
* Glenn D. West is a partner in the Corporate Department of Weil, Gotshal &
Manges LLP in Dallas, Texas.
** W. Benton Lewis, Jr. is a student associate in the Corporate Department of Weil,
Gotshal & Manges LLP in Dallas, Texas. Mr. West and Mr. Lewis express special thanks
to S. Scott Parel, a partner in the Corporate Department of Weil, Gotshal and Manges
LLP, for his thoughtful edits, and to Richard L. White, an associate in the Corporate Department of Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, for his editorial assistance.
1. As in previous years, this Survey has examined the decisions of Texas state courts,
federal district and bankruptcy courts in Texas and the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit. Since the scope of the Survey is limited to issues of Texas corporate law,
we have not discussed purely federal corporate issues or federal or state securities law
issues.
2. Although the 2008 Survey period formally runs between October 1, 2006 and September 30, 2007, we incorporated noteworthy cases decided as late as March 13, 2008.
3. See generally Glenn D. West & Emmanuel U. Obi, Corporations,60 SMU L. REV.
885 (2007); Glenn D. West & Benton B. Bodamer, Corporations,59 SMU L. REV. 1143
(2006); Glenn D. West & Sarah E. Stasny, Corporations,58 SMU L. REV. 719 (2005);
Glenn D. West & Adam D. Nelson, Corporations,57 SMU L. REV. 799 (2004); Glenn D.
West & Susan Y. Chao, Corporations,56 SMU L. REV. 1395 (2003); Glenn D. West &
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As in the past, our review encompasses not only traditional statutory corporate law issues, but also the Texas judiciary's willingness to ignore the
statutorily mandated separateness of the corporate form to achieve equitable results. While veil piercing cases continue to comprise a large number of Texas corporate law decisions each year, the cases that assess
liability against non-parties to corporate contracts based upon extra-contractual theories of liability are equally important, and must be fully appreciated and distinguished. In approaching these issues, we have
organized our discussion into three parts.
First, Part II of this Survey examines judicial veil piercing. In the past,
we have generally emphasized "traditional"veil piercing actions, which
are governed by Article 2.21 of the Texas Business Corporation Act. 4
This year, however, we highlight the reappearance of what courts and
commentators have called "reverse" veil piercing actions. 5 In Part 11 (A)
we recount the history of Texas reverse veil piercing jurisprudence, and
discuss two cases from this Survey period that grapple with its proper
application. Our coverage of judicial veil piercing concludes in Part II
(B) with a report on a Texas Supreme Court decision that reversed a
lower court opinion we criticized in 2006 for its aggressive application of
the dubious "single business enterprise" doctrine.
Next, Part III of this Survey reminds practitioners that judicial veil
piercing and personal participation in conduct giving rise to extra-contractual claims do not constitute the only means by which corporate directors, officers, shareholders, or affiliates may be held legally
responsible for the liabilities of a corporate entity. As we have warned in
the past, the Texas Tax Code 6 renders the directors and officers of a corporation individually liable for each debt that the company incurs after
the corporation fails to pay franchise taxes, and forfeits its corporate
charter as a result.
Finally, Part IV of this Survey examines recent Texas cases that address
the enforceability of merger, disclaimer of reliance, and "as-is" clauses,
which are designed to limit a contracting party's exposure to extra-contractual claims. Because extra-contractual tort claims can impose personal liability on the officers of corporations without judicially piercing
the corporate veil, these provisions are vital to the preservation of the
Brandy L. Treadway, Corporations,55 SMU L. REV. 803 (2002); Glenn D. West, Corporations, 54 SMU L. REv. 1221 (2001); Glenn D. West & Christopher M. Fairman, Corporations, 53 SMU L. REV. 773 (2000).
4. See TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.21 § A (Vernon 2003); TEX. Bus. ORGS.
CODE ANN. § 21.223(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2008). Note that for corporations formed on or
after January 1, 2006, for corporations formed prior to January 1, 2006 that self-elect, and
as of January 1, 2010, for all corporations, section 21.223-.225 of the Texas Business Organizations Code ("TBOC") replaces Article 2.21 as the controlling law. Because the requirements of the TBOC are identical to those of Article 2.21, however, the change does not
affect the substance of the current law. See also Formosa Plastics Corp. v. Kajima Int'l,
Inc., 216 S.W.3d 436, 461 n.6 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2006, pet. denied).
5. Gregory S. Crespi, The Reverse Pierce Doctrine: Applying Appropriate Standards,

16 J.

CORP. L. 33, 34 (1990).
6. See TEX. TAX CODE

ANN.

§ 171.255(a) (Vernon 2008).
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corporate shield. By identifying the factors that courts emphasized as dispositive in these decisions, we hope that this discussion will help practitioners draft unassailable agreements capable of facilitating "walk-away
not only for the corporate obligor, but also for its
deal certainty,"
7
officers.
II.

THE SANCTITY OF THE CORPORATE FORM IN TEXAS

Texas courts have consistently emphasized the importance of separating the liabilities of a corporation, on the one hand, from the liabilities of
that corporation's officers, directors, shareholders, and affiliates, on the
other hand.8 During this Survey period, the Fifth Court of Appeals in
Dallas recognized that it is a "bedrock principle of corporate law [in
Texas] ...that an individual can incorporate a business and thereby...
shield himself from personal liability for the corporation's contractual obligations." 9 Another Texas case from this Survey period acknowledged
the tenet, "long embedded in [American law], that a parent corporation
10
(or shareholder) is not liable for the acts of its subsidiary."
Nevertheless, as we have lamented in prior surveys, Texas judges have
frequently exercised their equitable authority to "pierce the corporate
veil," and blur the long-recognized distinction between corporations and
their shareholders or subsidiaries."' While Texas veil piercing jurisprudence has retreated from its most radical stage, set when the Texas Supreme Court held in Castleberry v. Branscum that a corporation's
contract creditors could recover against its shareholders wherever "recognizing the separate corporate existence would bring about an inequitable
result," courts have continued to apply various theories to render individ12
And we
uals or affiliated entities liable for corporate-level obligations.
believe that the continued recognition and application of the "single busi7. See Glenn D. West & Emmanuel U. Obi, Avoiding Fraud and Other Extra-Contractual Claims: There May be More to the Deal than the Contract-2007,2007 MERGERS &
AcQuISrlONS INST. 1 (2007); Glenn D. West, Avoiding Extra-ContractualClaims in Portfolio Company Sales Transactions-Is "Walk-Away" Deal Certainty Achievable for the
Seller?, WELL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP PRIVATE EQuiTY ALERT (Mar. 2006), http://

www.weil.com.
8. See West & Obi, supra note 3, at 886-87 (noting that "Texas courts have long purported to uphold the importance of the corporation as an entity separate and distinct from
its officers, shareholders, and affiliates."); Crespi, supra note 5, at 34.
9. Sparks v. Booth, 232 S.W.3d 853, 868 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.) (citing
Willis v. Donnelly, 199 S.W.3d 262, 271 (Tex. 2006)).
10. In re Moore, 379 B.R. 284, 289 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2007) (citing United States v.
Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998)).
11. See In re Morrison, 361 B.R. 107 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2007); PHC-Minden, L.P. v.
Kimberly-Clark Corp., 235 S.W.3d 163 (Tex. 2007); Formosa Plastics Corp. v. Kajima Int'l,
Inc., 216 S.W.3d 436, 461-63 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2006, pet. denied); PHC-Minden,
L.P. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 202 S.W.3d 193 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2005), rev'd, 235 S.W.3d
163 (Tex. 2007); see also Crespi, supra note 5, at 34.
12. See Castleberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270, 272-73 (Tex. 1986). During this Survey period, the First Court of Appeals in Houston extended state law principles for piercing the corporate veil to limited liability companies. See also McCarthy v. Wani Venture,
A.S., 251 S.W.3d 573 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied).
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ness enterprise" theory in veil piercing cases threatens to return Texas to
13
its most radical period.
In the wake of Castleberry and its progeny, the Texas legislature acted
to arrest the debilitating commercial uncertainty created by the Texas judiciary's approach towards the sanctity of the corporate form, particularly
with respect to contractual obligations. 14 Now, under Article 2.21.A of
the Business Corporation Act, a court may only hold a shareholder or
affiliate liable for "any contractual obligation of the corporation or any
matter relating to or arising from the obligation" on the basis of "alter
ego" or "other similar theory" if the shareholder or affiliate has used the
corporation to perpetrate an "actual fraud" for his or her "personal benefit."' 15 Article 2.21.B reserves Article 2.21.A as the exclusive means by
which Texas courts may impose corporate obligations on shareholders or
affiliates. 16 Accordingly, to hold the shareholders or affiliates of a corporation liable in "any matter arising out of or related to" a contractual
obligation of that corporation, a plaintiff must prove that the shareholder
or affiliate used that same corporation to perpetrate an "actual fraud"
against a counterparty to the contract in furtherance of some direct "personal benefit.' 17
A. REVERSE VEIL-PIERCING
Though initially reluctant, Texas courts have increasingly recognized
Article 2.21 as the sole means of "traditional" veil piercing, at least in
situations involving a direct, contractually created obligation.18 But during this Survey period, a series of cases addressed the more novel issue of
"reverse" veil piercing, whereby "a corporate insider or a person with a
claim against a corporate insider" attempts to treat the insider and the
corporate entity as a single person for some purpose.' 9 Because reverse
veil-piercing claims appear to fall outside the scope of Article 2.21, courts
13. See West & Obi, supra note 3, at 891-93; West & Bodamer, supra note 3, at 114553.

14. See TEX. Bus. CORP. AC ANN. art. 2.21; TEx. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN. §§ 21.223.225; West & Chao, supra note 3, at 1396-97 (tracing amendments to Article 2.21, enacted
to reverse judicial attempts to disregard the separateness of the corporate entity); Crespi,
supra note 5, at 34.
15. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.21 § A; TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN.

§ 21.223(A)(2).
16. See TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.21 § B; TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN.
§ 21.224.
17. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.21 § A; TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 21.223
(A)(2). During this Survey period, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals in Houston reiterated
that a plaintiff must present affirmative evidence of a tangible "personal benefit" to pierce
the corporate veil in an action governed by Article 2.21 § A. A mere allegation will not
suffice. See Solutioneers Consulting, Ltd. v. Gulf Greyhound Partners, Ltd., 237 S.W.3d
379, 388-89 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.).
18. Texas courts have been less receptive to the application of Article 2.21 to "matters
arising out of or related to" contractual obligations. See West & Obi, supra note 3, at 88895; West & Bodamer, supra note 3, at 1146-53; West & Chao, supra note 3, at 1396-1408;
West & Treadway, supra note 3, at 804-18; Crespi, supra note 5, at 55-56.
19. See generally ASARCO LLC v. Ams. Mining Corp., 382 B.R. 49 (S.D. Tex. 2007);
Acceptance Indem. Ins. Co. v. Maltez, C.A. No. H-04-2222, 2007 WL 2908433 (S.D. Tex.
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to prescribe approprihave examined the attendant policy 2considerations
0
adjudication.
their
for
standards
ate
At least one commentator has recognized two distinct types of reverse
veil piercing: "outsider" reverse veil piercing and "insider" reverse veil
piercing.2 1 In an outsider reverse veil piercing claim, the creditors of a
shareholder of a corporation attempt to execute upon the assets of that
22
In an
corporation in order to satisfy claims against such shareholder.
insider reverse veil piercing claim, by contrast, a dominant shareholder or
other controlling insider seeks to disregard the corporate form to "avail
the insider of corporate claims against third parties," or to shelter corporate assets from third party claims. 23 Accordingly, while insiders pursue
insider reverse veil piercing claims over the objections of adversely affected third parties who dealt in good faith with the corporate entity (not
the insider), insiders generally oppose outsider reverse veil piercing
assets of a corporate entity to the
claims because they directly expose2 the
4
shareholders.
of
separate liabilities
1.

Outsider Reverse Veil Piercing

Outsider reverse veil piercing actions invoke a different set of policy
25
considerations than traditional or insider reverse veil piercing actions.
First, outsider reverse veil piercing "prevent[s] the shareholders of a corporation from shielding corporate assets from claims against a controlling
insider," and thereby impairs investors' expectation that the corporation
in which they invest will be insulated from the personal dealings of controlling shareholders. 26 But even where an outsider reverse veil piercing
action may not affect a corporation's other investors, this extreme remedy could "[pervert] established Bankruptcy Code priorities and state law
creditor[s'] rights provisions by putting creditors of an individual shareholder on a parity with creditors of the corporation. '27 Generally, where
a shareholder's creditor seeks recourse (by choice or necessity) against
the shareholder's interest in the corporation, the creditor must attach the
shareholder's equity, and assume the shareholder's subordinate position
relative to the corporation's creditors. 28 Outsider reverse veil piercing,
however, permits a shareholder's creditor to bypass equity, and share pari
Oct. 3, 2007); In re Moore, 379 B.R. 284 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2007); see also Crespi, supra

note 5, at 35-37.

20. See Crespi, supra note 5, at 34, 37.
21. See, e.g., id. at 37-38.
22. See id. at 56. In the context of the parent-subsidiary relationship, the reverse veil

piercing remedy permits the creditors of a debtor parent corporation to target the assets of

a non-debtor subsidiary to fulfill the parent corporation's obligations. See id. at 55-56; see
also In re Moore, 379 B.R. at 289-94.
23. Crespi, supra note 5, at 37-38; see also ASARCO, 382 B.R. at 66-67; Acceptance
Indem., 2007 WL 2908433, at *1, 4-6.
24. Crespi, supra note 5, at 37-38.

25. See id. at 64.
26. See id.

27. See In re Moore, 379 B.R. 284, 295 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2007).

28. See id.

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

passu with the corporation's pre-existing contract and tort creditors.2 9
This allows a shareholder's individual creditors to benefit at the expense
30
of the corporation's unsecured creditors.
Because neither the Texas Legislature nor the Texas Supreme Court
has directly addressed the legal viability of outsider reverse veil piercing,
a small number of intermediate appellate decisions offers a murky
roadmap for the doctrine's application under Texas law. 31 The Second
Court of Appeals in Fort Worth first recognized outsider reverse veil
piercing in its 1966 American Petroleum Exchange, Inc. v. Lord decision,
which featured a judgment creditor's attempt to execute upon the property of a corporation in which the judgment debtor, individually and as
trustee for his daughter, owned "the great majority" of the outstanding
stock. 32 Finding that the judgment debtor and the corporation were "one
and the same" under the "alter ego" theory, the court emphasized that
only "two or three" other individuals owned "very few shares" of the
corporation's stock before affirming the trial court's decision to "disregard the corporate fiction," and subject the corporation to the debtor's
individual liability. 33 Two marital property division cases from the same
court comprise the balance of Texas reverse veil piercing case law, 34 each
treating the assets and earnings of a corporation as belonging to an indi35
vidual spouse.
In 1990, the Fifth Circuit cited the foregoing cases in Zahra Spiritual
Trust v. United States to support the proposition that outsider reverse veil
piercing was permissible upon a "finding that the individual (debtor) and
the corporation should be treated as alter egos."'36 Nevertheless, because
Texas would "not treat a corporation and an individual as [alter egos]
unless the individual [had] some ownership interest in the corporation,"
the Zahra court ultimately remanded the case to determine whether the
affected debtors' possible interest in a trust, which owned shares in the
targeted corporation, sufficed to "equate them with shareholders for purposes of disregarding" the corporate fiction. 37 Since Zahra, the Fifth Circuit has "acknowledged" the availability of reverse veil piercing as an
equitable remedy in Texas on at least three occasions, but has not re29. See id.
30. See id.

31. See id. at 292-95 for more information on the history of reverse veil piercing in
Texas.
32. See Am. Petroleum Exch., Inc. v. Lord, 399 S.W.2d 213, 216-18 (Tex. App.-Fort

Worth 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

33. See id.
34. For Fifth Circuit decisions discussing reverse veil piercing under Texas law, see
Bollore S.A. v. Imp. Warehouse, Inc., 448 F.3d 317, 325 (5th Cir. 2006); Schimmelpenninck
v. Byrne, 183 F.3d 347, 358 (5th Cir. 1999); Permian Petroleum Co. v. Petroleos Mexicanos,
934 F.2d 635, 644 (5th Cir. 1991); Zahra Spiritual Trust v. United States, 910 F.2d 240, 244
(5th Cir. 1990).
35. See In re Moore, 379 B.R. 284, 296 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2007); Zisblatt v. Zisblatt,
693 S.W.2d 944, 955 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, writ dism'd w.o.j.); Dillingham v. Dillingham, 434 S.W.2d 459, 462 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1968, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
36. See Zahra, 910 F.2d at 244.
37. Id.
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cently applied the doctrine to resolve a dispositive issue.38
Against this backdrop, we are encouraged that the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas finally circumscribed
Texas outsider reverse veil piercing jurisprudence during this Survey period. 39 In In re Moore, a Chapter Seven Trustee 40 (the "Trustee") alleged
that Mr. Moore, an individual debtor, whose wife owned 100% of JHM
Properties, Inc. ("JHM"), which in turn owned 50% of Brunswick, Inc.
("Brunswick"), controlled and manipulated JHM, and therefore Brunswick, to defraud his creditors. 41 Accordingly, the Trustee argued that Mr.
Moore was the alter ego of both corporations, and the court should reverse pierce the veil of each, so that Mr. Moore's creditors could access
42
Brunswick's assets to satisfy their claims against him.
After reciting the relevant Texas and Fifth Circuit case law, the bankruptcy court properly expressed concern that reverse veil piercing "has
evolved and become accepted into the mainstream, starkly during a time
when the Texas Legislature is limiting the availability of traditional veil
piercing, and without meaningful discussion of what, in substance, the
doctrine does (and can potentially do)."' 4 3 Indeed, the opinion continued,
"this court believes that reverse veil piercing-if generally applied withstressing the
out tight parameters-is a somewhat draconian remedy," 44
doctrine's implications for the rights of corporate creditors.
Given the "absence of any Texas Supreme Court case clearly adopting
reverse veil piercing" and the "absence of Texas or Fifth Circuit authority
that clearly defines the specific parameters for its use," the court imported a standard observed in other jurisdictions to limit the doctrine's
application. 45 Reverse veil piercing, the court held, "should only be applied when it is clear that it will not prejudice non-culpable shareholders
or other stakeholders (such as creditors) of a corporation. '46 The foregoing approach, the court concluded, "not only respects due process and
established creditors' rights principles, but also gives proper deference to
the will of the Texas Legislature-i.e., to impose a measured use of alter
38. See In re Moore, 279 B.R. at 294 (citing Bollore, 448 F.3d at 325; Schimmelpenninck, 183 F.3d at 358; Permian Petroleum, 934 F.2d at 644).
39. See In re Moore, 379 B.R. at 295-96.

40. The Chapter Seven Trustee brought suit against Mr. Moore, JHM and Brunswick
on behalf of plaintiff creditors to enhance the value of the bankruptcy estate. Id. at 285-86.
41. See id.at 286-88 for a more comprehensive discussion of the relevant facts.
42. See id. at 285, 287-88. Beyond the threshold issue of whether the court could reverse pierce the veils of both corporations, the plaintiffs' case required them to establish:
(1) that Mr. Moore was a de facto shareholder of JHM because Mrs. Moore's equity interest in the corporation was not her separate property; and (2) that JHM was the alter ego of
Mr. Moore so that Mr. Moore, and not JHM, owned a de facto equity interest in Brunswick. See id. at 296.
43. Id. at 294.
44. Id. at 295.
45. Id. See also Stoebner v. Lingenfelter, 115 F.3d 576, 579-80 (8th Cir. 1997) (indicating that Minnesota has only recognized the doctrine of reverse corporate piercing in very
limited circumstances; namely, when no shareholder or creditor would be adversely affected); Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 F.3d 750, 758 (7th Cir. 1995).
46. In re Moore, 379 B.R. at 295.
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ego doctrine. 47
Although unresolved issues of material fact precluded summary judgment,48 we applaud the bankruptcy court's recognition that Article 2.21
should restrict a judge's discretion to disregard the corporate form, both
traditionally and in reverse. 49 The Moore court articulated an unambiguous standard that defines a judge's equitable power to reverse pierce the
corporate veil.5 0 Importantly, by limiting the availability of outsider reverse veil piercing to cases in which the remedy would not prejudice nonculpable stakeholders, the rule promotes commercial certainty, and precludes the type of collateral impact on unsuspecting parties contemplated
51
in the insider reverse veil piercing case discussed below.
2. Insider Reverse Veil Piercing and Single Business Enterprise
Without appropriate restrictions, insider reverse veil piercing can be as
52
debilitating for commercial certainty as outsider reverse veil piercing.
A case before the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Texas during the Survey period illustrates the hazard that insider reverse veil piercing could present if permitted on the basis of the legally
53
dubious "single business enterprise" theory.
As our prior Survey articles have explained, some intermediate appellate courts in Texas have employed the "single business enterprise" doctrine to pierce the veil separating affiliated corporations, and aggregate
their respective activities to hold one such corporation liable for the debts
of the other, or subject one corporation to litigation in the same jurisdictions as the other. 54 Courts have exposed corporations to the liabilities
and jurisdictional contacts of their affiliates under this "single business
enterprise" theory whereby a balance of factors suggests that the entities
47. Id. at 296.
48. The court identified the following factual issues as unresolved: (1) whether Mr.
Moore was a de facto shareholder of JHM Properties, Inc.; (2) whether JHM Properties,
Inc. was the alter ego of Mr. Moore, so that Mr. Moore and not JHM Properties, Inc. was
the de facto equity interest owner of Brunswick; (3) whether plaintiff could demonstrate
that Mr. Moore satisfied Zahra's general standards for a finding of alter ego for purposes
of reverse veil piercing; and (4) whether applying veil piercing against Brunswick would
prejudice non-culpable shareholders or other stakeholders, such as creditors. Id. at 296-97.
49. See id. at 290-91, 296.
50. See id. Cf. PHC-Minden, L.P. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp, 235 S.W.3d 163, 175 (Tex.
2007).
51. See Acceptance Indem. Ins. Co. v. Maltez, No. H-04-2222, 2007 WL 2908433, at *67 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 3, 2007); In re Moore, 379 B.R. at 296-96.
52. Crespi, supra note 5, at 50-51.
53. See Acceptance Indem., 2007 WL 2908433, at *1, 4-7.
54. See PHC-Minden, L.P. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 202 S.W.3d 193, 200-203; West &
Obi, supra note 3, at 891-93; West & Bodamer, supra note 3, at 1146-48. But see Country
Vill. Homes, Inc. v. Patterson, 236 S.W.3d 413, 427 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007,
pet. granted, judm't vacated w.r.m.) (stating that the Texarkana Court of Appeals has emphasized that Article 2.21 controls all veil piercing claims founded in contract, so the "actual fraud" requirement of the statute applies) (citing Texas-Ohio Gas, Inc. v. Mecom, 28
S.W.3d 129, 137-38 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2000, no pet.)).
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integrated their resources in pursuit of a "common business purpose. '55
In Acceptance Indemnity Insurance Co. v. Maltez, a judgment debtor
corporation invoked single business enterprise principles as an insider to
access the insurance policy of its affiliate, even though the judgment
debtor was not specifically named on the policy as an insured. 56 The case
involved an insurer's ("Indemnity") attempt to resolve a dispute with its
named insured ("AAI") regarding the scope of a policy covering AAI's
automotive repair business. 57 After an employee ("Maltez") won a state
court judgment against AAI's separately-incorporated affiliate ("Salvage") for injuries he suffered while working on the joint premises of the
two entities, AAI and Salvage alleged that they constituted a single business enterprise, and therefore, the policy required Indemnity to indemnify Salvage for its losses.58 There is no question that this same
corporation would have vehemently objected if a creditor of its affiliate
asserted that it and its affiliate were a single business enterprise for the
purpose of assessing liability under a traditional veil piercing theory, and
Article 2.21 would have aided this corporation in avoiding such result. 59
The court declined to grant summary judgment in favor of Indemnity
because the parties had not settled dispositive factual issues, but properly
cautioned that "it is a serious and questionable step to hold a party to any
contract, let alone a contract in the complex arena of insurance, liable for
the debt of another party with whom the original party had no contractual or tort relationship. ' 60 After deferring decision on the applicability
of the single business enterprise doctrine as alleged, the court inserted an
of "equity" as the bainstructive footnote that illustrated the subjectivity
61
sis for disregarding the corporate form:
The uncertainty of application of the SBE [single business enterprise] doctrine in this context is highlighted by the fact that the doctrine is designed to prevent "inequitable results." . . . The doctrine

would appear to achieve its goal if liability is assigned to constituent
members of an SBE, allowing an injured plaintiff to seek recovery
from the enterprise as a whole. It is not clear, [however,] how requiring a non-SBE entity, such as an insurance company, to indemnify an SBE constituent, that was not a named insured under the
55. See West & Bodamer, supra note 3, at 1146-48 (noting that the "single business
enterprise theory treats the sanctity of the corporate form as a mere balancing test between
non-exhaustive, non-exclusive factors"); Marilyn Montano, Note, The Single Business Enterprise Theory in Texas: A Singularly Bad Idea?, 55 BAYLOR L. REV. 1163, 1176 (2003)
(setting forth a list of factors that Texas courts consider in applying single business enterprise theory, including common employees, common offices, centralized accounting, common business names, common officers, common shareholders, and a common telephone
number).
56. See Acceptance Indem., 2007 WL 2908433, at *1, 5-6.
57. Id. at *1.
58. Id. at *5 ("a finding that two or more entities operated as [a single business enterprise] permits recovery against one entity for the debts and liabilities of another").
59. See TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.21 § A; TEX. Bus. ORoS. CODE ANN.
§ 21.223(a)(2).
60. See Acceptance Indem., 2007 WL 2908433, at *7.
61. Id. at *6-7.
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insurance contract, and whose risks may not have been considered
during the underwriting process, furthers the goal of a narrow doctrine that 62is intended primarily to permit recovery from a
wrongdoer.
Though the court did not expressly identify Acceptance Indemnity as an
insider reverse veil piercing case, the opinion commendably considered
the consequences of defendants' claim in the context of the malleable
single business enterprise theory. 63 Indeed, because the single business
enterprise doctrine only requires a showing that two or more entities integrated their resources to achieve a common business purpose, the doctrine, as a facility for insider reverse veil piercing, could empower nearly
any affiliate of the separate corporate beneficiary of a contractual obliga64
tion to seek the benefits of that separate corporate beneficiary.
B.

UPDATE: SINGLE BUSINESS ENTERPRISE AND
"JURISDICTIONAL" VEIL PIERCING

While Acceptance Indemnity revealed the extent to which parties may

seek to exploit the single business enterprise theory at the expense of
unsuspecting third parties, another case decided during this Survey period illuminated the doctrine's dubious legality and unpredictable application under Texas law generally. 65 In PHC-Minden v. Kimberly-Clark
Corp., the plaintiff's estate asserted a wrongful death claim in Texas state
court against Kimberly-Clark Corporation, alleging that Kotex tampons
manufactured by Kimberly-Clark triggered the toxic shock syndrome that
caused the plaintiff's death. 66 Kimberly-Clark filed a third-party petition
in the same forum against PHC-Minden, L.P. ("Minden"), which owned
the Louisiana hospital at which plaintiff sought treatment, claiming that
Minden's negligence proximately caused the plaintiff's death. 67 Because

Minden was a not a Texas resident and did not conduct business in Texas,
Kimberly-Clark alleged that the court should impute the Texas contacts
of Minden's parent, Province Health Care ("Province"), to Minden because Minden and Province constituted a single business enterprise.
Therefore, Kimberly-Clark claimed that Minden could also be subject to
68
the jurisdiction of a Texas court.
In a decision that we criticized in 2006, the Twelfth Court of Appeals in
Tyler applied a malleable balancing test to determine that Province's op-

erations in Texas could, in fact, be imputed to Minden, emphasizing the
62. Id. at *7 n.22 (internal citations omitted).
63. See id. at *5.
64. See id.
65. See PHC-Minden, L.P. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 235 S.W.3d 163, 175 (Tex. 2007);
Olympia Capital Assocs., L.P. v. Jackson, 247 S.W.3d 399, 412 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, no
pet.); PHC-Minden, L.P. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 202 S.W.3d 193, 200-03 (Tex. App.Corpus Christi 2006), rev'd, 235 S.W.3d 163 (Tex. 2007); West & Bodamer, supra note 3, at
1146-48.
66. PHC-Minden, 235 S.W.3d at 165.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 165-66.
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extent to which the entities shared control, offices, employees, accounting
services, employee services, and profits and losses. 69 Stressing factors
common to most parent-subsidiary relationships, the court disregarded
the corporate form without indicating what, if anything, affiliated corpo70
rations could do in the future to avoid a similar result.
The Texas Supreme Court reversed, declaring that a finding of a single
business enterprise, for purposes of "jurisdictional" veil piercing, requires
proof of greater control than that which a parent typically exercises over
its subsidiary. 7 1 The court first cited its Southern Union Co. v. City of
Edinburg decision to reiterate that the Texas Supreme Court has never
endorsed the single business enterprise theory. 72 Nevertheless, the supreme court held that the plaintiff in a jurisdictional veil piercing action
must prove a "degree of control ...greater than that normally associated
with common ownership and directorship. ' 73 The evidence, the court
continued, "must show that the two entities cease to be separate so that
the corporate fiction should be disregarded to prevent fraud or injustice."'74 Accordingly, absent any "evidence of control other than that
consistent with Province's investor status . . . the court of appeals erred in
''75
imputing Province's Texas contacts to Minden.
Though we commend the Texas Supreme Court's acknowledgment that
common indicia of affiliation should not compel judges to eviscerate the
corporate form, we remain concerned by the court's refusal to clarify the
legal legitimacy or application of the single business enterprise doctrine
under Texas law. 76 Indeed, by consistently declining to decide whether
the doctrine constitutes "a necessary addition to Texas law,"'77 the court
provides little guidance to corporate planners regarding the extent to
78
which entities may be accountable for the acts of their affiliates.
Compounding this ambiguity, the discretionary standard articulated by
the PHC-Minden court reeks of Castleberry and the commercial uncertainty that it unleashed. 79 Just as practitioners could not confidently advise their clients when "recognizing the separate corporate existence
would bring about an inequitable result,"8 0° counsel will also have trouble
69. Kimberly-Clark, 202 S.W.3d at 200. See West & Bodamer, supra note 3, at 1146-

48.
70. See id. at 200, 204
71. PHC-Minden, 235 S.W.3d at 176-77.
72. Id. at 173 (citing Southern Union Co. v. City of Edinburg, 129 S.W.3d 74, 86-87
(Tex. 2003) (noting that the Texas Supreme Court has "never considered the 'single business enterprise' concept in any detail" and declining to decide "whether a theory of 'single
business enterprise' is a necessary addition to Texas law regarding the theory of alter ego
for disregarding corporate structure")).
73. Id. at 175.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See id. at 173-75.
77. See id. at 174 (citing Southern Union Co., 129 S.W.3d at 86-87).
78. See id.
79. See id. at 175; Castleberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270, 272-73 (Tex. 1986); West
& Chao, supra note 3, at 1396-97.
80. See Castleberry,721 S.W.2d at 272-73.
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determining what degree of control is "greater than that normally associated with common ownership and directorship, '8 1 such that "the corporate fiction should be disregarded to prevent fraud or injustice" 82 under
PHC-Minden.
III.

LAPSE OF THE CORPORATE FORM AS A SOURCE OF
DIRECTOR AND OFFICER LIABILITY

The cases discussed in the foregoing paragraphs examined judicial veil
piercing; namely, the application of a court's equitable authority to conflate the claims, liabilities, or jurisdictional contacts of a corporation and
its shareholders or affiliates. As we have warned in prior surveys, however, a corporation's failure to comply with certain legislative requirements may trigger the statutory disintegration of the corporate veil,
leaving directors and officers with no barrier to shield them from the lia83
bilities of the entity.

Section 171.255 of the Texas Tax Code imposes liability on the directors
84
and officers of a corporation that has forfeited its corporate privileges
"for each debt of the corporation that is created or incurred in [Texas]
after the date on which [a] report, tax, or penalty is due [under the statute] and before the privileges are revived. '85 Once a corporation has forfeited its corporate privileges, "the liability of a director or officer is in
the same manner and to the same extent as if the director or officer were
'8 6
a partner and the corporation was a partnership.
In light of this risk, we are pleased that the Fifth Court of Appeals in
Dallas clarified the limits of the statute's application during this Survey
period. 87 PACCAR Financial Corp. v. Potter raised the question of
whether liability under the Tax Code provision extends to individuals
who served as directors and officers of a corporation when the corporation failed to timely file its tax report, but resigned before the disputed
debt was created or incurred. 88 In Potter, plaintiff PACCAR, a financial
corporation, alleged that two former officers and directors ("the Potters")
of an accounting firm were liable for various contract claims that arose
after the Potters relinquished their positions on the board of directors of
PACCAR. 89 Because the Potters held their board seats on the date that
81. See PHC-Minden, 235 S.W.3d at 172-75.
82. Id. at 175.
83. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.255(a); In re Trammell, 246 S.W.3d 815, 821-22
(Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.); PACCAR Fin. Corp. v. Potter, 239 S.W.3d 879, 880 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.); West & Chao, supra note 3, at 1399-1401.
84. Under section 171.251 of the Texas Tax Code, the state comptroller may forfeit the
privileges of a corporation to transact business in the state if such corporation does not
timely file a required report or pay taxes due under the statute. TEX. TAX CODE ANN.
§ 171.251.
85. West & Chao, supra note 3, at 1399-1400 (citing TEX. TAX CODE ANN.
§ 171.255(a)).
86. Trammell, 246 S.W.3d at 822 (citing TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.255(b)).
87. See Potter, 239 S.W.3d at 881-83.
88. Id. at 881.
89. Id.
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the franchise report became delinquent, PACCAR argued that the statute
required the court to hold the Potters individually liable for the asserted
claims. 90
The court rejected PACCAR's theory, explaining that the legislature
designed the provision to penalize directors for permitting a delinquent
corporation to create or incur debts, not to punish tardy filings. 91 "It is
the act of creating or incurring a debt when the franchise report is delinquent that triggers personal liability once the corporate privileges are forfeited."' 92 According to the court, "the legislature intended that personal
liability [attach] only to those directors and officers 'of the corporation' at
the time the debt is created or incurred" because those directors "abused
'93
the corporate privilege," and are, therefore, "culpable.
Beyond its interpretation of section 171.255, PACCAR serves as an important reminder that practitioners must ensure that their corporate clients take all necessary precautions to avoid the statutory imposition of
liability on directors, officers, shareholders, and affiliates. 94
IV.

AVOIDING EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL CLAIMS THROUGH
THE EFFECTIVE USE OF NON-RELIANCE CLAUSES

Failure to perform a contractual promise under Texas law generally
renders the non-performing party liable only for breach of contract damages, which courts typically confine to the benefit that the non-breaching
party would have derived from full performance of the agreement. Indeed, cognizant that parties to sophisticated commercial transactions diligently allocate the attendant risks, courts are reluctant to subject private
agreements to "readjustment by judges and juries '95 under the less pre96
dictable principles of tort law.
Against parties' interest in establishing their rights and obligations by
contract, however, courts have balanced "the perceived public policy
need to avoid treating a contract that was procured 'by fraud [as] simply
another contract dispute.' ' '97 Accordingly, while "mere nonfeasance
under a contract creates liability only for breach of contract, '98 a "contractual promise made with no intention of performing may give rise to
an action for fraudulent inducement," 99 because "the duty not to induce
'another to enter into a contract through the use of [fraud] . .. is separate
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 882.
Id. at 883.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 881-83.

95. See Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299, 306 (Tex. 2006)

96. See West & Obi, supra note 3, at 896.
97. West & Obi, supra note 3, at 896.
98. Lookshin v. Union Planters Bank, No. H-05-3834, 2006 WL 3147330, at *10 (S.D.
Tex. 2006 Oct. 30, 2006) (quoting Crawford v. Ace Sigh, Inc. 417 S.W.2d 12, 13 (Tex.
1996)).
99. See Tony Gullo, 212 S.W.3d at 304.
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and independent from the duties established by the contract itself."

' 10 0

Therefore, "if one makes a promise in a written agreement, any subsequent breach is simply a breach of contract." 10 1 But "if one makes a
promise that induces someone to enter into a contract in which that
promise is memorialized, personal liability for fraud may exist. ' 10 2 As a
result, the Texas Supreme Court has held that tort damages are "recoverthe fraudable for a fraudulent inducement claim irrespective of whether
10 3
ulent representations are later subsumed in [the] contract.'
Beyond its implications for both freedom of contract and commercial
certainty, the imposition of tort liability in a contractual dispute threatens
serious consequences for non-performing parties.' 0 4 First, while prevailing contract claimants are generally entitled only to the "benefit of their
bargain," a successful tort plaintiff may recover exemplary or punitive
damages "in excess of the actual damages the aggrieved party sustained. '105 Moreover, courts may hold corporate officers, even those acting solely in their occupational capacities, personally liable for any

tortious conduct in which they directly participated on behalf of their employers. 10 6 As we have reminded practitioners in prior surveys, it is not
necessary to pierce the corporate veil to impose liability on a corporate
officer if a tort plaintiff can demonstrate that the corporate officer knowingly participated in the wrongdoing.1 0 7 And that wrongdoing may be as

simple as negligently failing to schedule an appropriate exception to a
that is later judged to have induced the formacontractual representation
10 8
tion of the contract.
100. See West & Bodamer, supra note 3, at 1157 (quoting Formosa Plastics Corp. v.
Presidio Eng'rs & Contractors, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 41, 46 (Tex. 1998)). In Thompson Advisory Group, Inc. v. First Horizon National Corporation,decided during this Survey period,
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas held that "allowing for
the recovery of fraud damages sounding in tort only when a plaintiff suffers an injury that
is distinct from the economic losses recoverable under a breach of contract claim is inconsistent with well-established law." Thompson Advisory Group v. First Horizon Nat'l
Corp., No. 3:07-CV-0683-G, 2007 WL 2284352, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Jul. 6, 2007). Accordingly,
the court held that "if a plaintiff presents legally sufficient evidence on each of the elements of a fraudulent inducement claim, any damages suffered as a result of the fraud
sound in tort." Id.
101. West & Obi, supra note 3, at 896.
102. Id.
103. Formosa, 960 S.W.2d at 47.
104. See Morris v. Kohls-York, 164 S.W.3d 686, 695 (Tex. App.-Austin 2005, pet.
dism'd); Centurion Planning Corp. v. Seabrook Venture II, 176 S.W.3d 498, 509 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st. Dist.] 2005, no pet.); Glattly v. CMS Viron Corp., 177 S.W.3d 438, 448
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.); West & Bodamer, supra note 3, at 1157
(citing Ennis v. Loiseau, 164 S.W.3d 698, 707-08 (Tex. App.-Austin 2005, no pet.). See
also Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Posey, 415 F.3d 391 (5th Cir. 2005)).
105. See Whitney Nat'l Bank v. Air Ambulance By B& C Flight Mgmt., Inc., No. H-042220, 2007 WL 3145788, at *13 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 25, 2007); West & Obi, supra note 7, at 2.
106. See, e.g., Alexander v. Lincare, Inc., No. 3:08-CV-1137-D, 2007 WL 4178592, at *3
(N.D. Tex. Nov. 27, 2007); see also West & Bodamer, supra note 3, at 1157.
107. See Walker v. Anderson, 232 S.W.3d 899, 918-19 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.)
(citing Kingston v. Helm, 82 S.W.3d 755, 758 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, pet. denied)); see also West & Stasny, supra note 3, at 726; West & Nelson, supra note 3, at 804;
West & Chao, supra note 3, at 1403; West & Treadway, supra note 3, at 811.
108. See West & Obi, supra note 7, at 6-8; West & Bodamer, supra note 3, at 1158-60.
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Given the risk associated with tort liability, sophisticated contracting
parties have sought to mitigate or eliminate their extra-contractual damages in search of "walk-away deal certainty." 10 9 Because fraudulent inducement actions require proof that the plaintiff relied on the relevant
misrepresentation or failure to disclose, contracts often include "merger"
or "disclaimer of reliance" clauses, which exclude extra-contractual representations from the scope of the parties' agreement, and thereby defeat
the "reliance" element of a fraudulent inducement claim as a matter of
110

law.
Texas law respects the "power of contracting parties to create contractual provisions that disclaim reliance on prior representations or
promises."11' 1 But "fraud in the inducement prevents a contract, including merger [clauses] and disclaimers of reliance, from coming into being."' 112 The Texas Supreme Court reconciled these seemingly
contradictory principles in Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. Swanson, when it
held that "the contract and the circumstances surrounding its formation
determine whether [a] disclaimer of reliance is binding."'1 13 If the contract and attendant circumstances "evince clear and specific intent to disclaim reliance on prior representations, then the element of reliance in a
114
fraudulent inducement claim is negated as a matter of law."
So-called "as-is" clauses, which stipulate a buyer's agreement to
purchase property in its current condition without any related assurances

109. See West & Obi, supra note 3, at 895-96; West & Bodamer, supra note 3, at 1160.
110. See West & Obi, supra note 7, at 8. See also Springs Window Fashions Div., Inc. v.
Blind Maker, Inc., 184 S.W.3d 840, 870-71 (Tex. App.-Austin 2006, pet. granted, judm't
vacated w.s.m.) ("By contractually 'canceling' all pre-[contract] 'agreements, negotiations,
commitments and understandings' and 'superseding' them with the [contract], a merger
clause ... [amounts] to a disclaimer of the existence of pre-contract agreements, promises
or representations and any right of the parties to rely upon them.").
111. See West & Bodamer, supra note 3, at 1160 (citing Steinberg v. Brennan, No. 3:03CV-0562, 2005 WL 1837961, at *3 (N.D. Tex. July 29, 2005)); see also Schlumberger Tech.
Corp. v. Swanson, 959 S.W.2d 171, 177-80 (Tex. 1997).
112. See id. During this Survey period, however, the Fourth Court of Appeals in San
Antonio supported its refusal to enforce a merger clause under Schlumberger by expressing concern that "if [seller] is correct in its argument that the merger clause precludes
[buyer's] fraud claims because it negates the element of reliance, 'there could never be a
cause of action for fraud in the sale of real estate unless the misrepresentation were contained in the deed itself."' San Antonio Props., L.P. v. PSRA Invs., Inc., 255 S.W.3d 255,
262 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2008, pet. filed) (citing ECC Parkway Joint Venture v. Baldwin, 765 S.W.2d 504, 512 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied)).
113. Schlumberger, 959 S.W.2d at 179.
114. Steinberg, 2005 WL 1837961 at *3 (citing Schlumberger, 959 S.W.2d at 179). New
York law approaches the enforceability of merger clauses similarly. New York courts focus
on the "extent to which a merger clause was expressly negotiated by sophisticated parties
using specific language or whether it was merely a general clause or standard clause." To
defeat a fraud claim, "a merger clause must disclaim reliance on the representation that
allegedly induced [a party] to enter into the agreement." And the "language of the merger
clause must directly relate to the specific misrepresentations which form the basis of the
fraud claim." Superior Technical Res., Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., No. 2003-10104, 2007
WL 4291575, at *10-11 (N.Y. Sup. Dec. 7, 2007) (citing Danann Realty Corp. v. Harris, 5
N.Y.2d 317, 320 (1959); Citibank, N.A. v. Plapinger, 66 N.Y.2d 90, 95 (1985); Homestead
Dev. Corp. v. Ayres, 244 A.D.2d 928, 928 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997); Sugar Ctr. Stores, Inc. v.
Pitts, 198 A.D.2d 833, 834 -(N.Y. App. Div. 1993)).
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from the seller, operate similarly under Texas law, permitting parties to

"contractually allocate the risk inherent in their respective transactions"
in pursuit of "walk-away deal certainty. '' 115 Logically, then, Texas jurisprudence regarding the enforceability of as-is causes parallel that of
merger clauses and disclaimers of reliance, emphasizing the parties' intentions as revealed through the words and context of their agreements. 1 6 According to the Texas Supreme Court in its influential
Prudential v. Jefferson Associates decision, "a buyer's affirmation and
agreement that he is not relying on representations by the seller should

be given effect" where "the 'as-is' clause is an important part of the basis
of the bargain, not an incidental or 'boiler-plate' provision, and is entered

17
into by parties of relatively equal bargaining position."'
During this Survey period, Texas courts generally interpreted Schlumberger and Prudentialnarrowly to preclude enforcement of merger, dis-

claimer of reliance, and as-is clauses. 1 18 This reverses a trend that we

noted in prior Surveys. 119 And in the context of corporate contracts, this
reversal heightens the risk that the officers who negotiate these agreements will face personal liability.
In In re the Heritage Organization,LLC, the United States Bankruptcy
Court for the Northern District of Texas incorrectly asserted that Texas
courts have only enforced merger and disclaimer of reliance clauses in
cases that are factually similar to Schlumberger120 The trustee, defen115. See West & Obi, supra note 7, at 15 (citing Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Jefferson
Assocs., Ltd., 896 S.W.2d 156, 162 (Tex. 1995)). Note that while as-is clauses and disclaimers of reliance are conceptually distinct, they intersect under Texas law to the extent that
Prudentialdeems an otherwise enforceable as-is clause unenforceable if the seller fraudulently induced the buyer into assenting to the clause, unless the contract also included a
disclaimer of reliance that is enforceable under Schlumberger. See San Antonio Props., 255
S.W3d at 216-62; Warehouse Assocs. Corp. Ctr. II, Inc. v. Celotex Corp., 192 S.W.3d 225,
232-33 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied).
116. See Prudential, 896 S.W.2d at 162. See also Lim v. Baker, No. 04-06-00703-CV,
2007 WL 4180153, at *5-6 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2007, no pet.); Chesson v. Hall, No. H01-315, 2007 WL 1964538, at *18-19 (S.D. Tex. Jul. 3, 2007); Kupchynsky v. Nardiello, 230
S.W.3d 685, 696-97 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, pet. filed); Fryar v. Mees, No. 10-06-00135,
2007 WL 1218221, at *2 (Tex. App.-Waco Apr. 25, 2007, no pet.); Gym-N-I Playgrounds
v. Snider, 220 S.W.3d 905, 911-13 (Tex. 2007).
117. Prudential,896 S.W.2d at 162.
118. See Whitney Nat'l Bank v. Air Ambulance By B&C Flight Mgmt., Inc., No. H-042220, 2007 WL 3145788, at *7-8 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 25, 2007); Gen. Retail Serv., Inc. v. Wireless
Toyz Franchise, LLC, 225 F. App'x 775, 790-91 (5th Cir. 2007); Mansfield Heliflight, Inc. v.
Bell/Agusta Aerospace Co., 507 F. Supp. 2d 638, 648-49 (N.D. Tex. 2007); In re The Heritage Org., LLC, 375 B.R. 230, 263-66 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2007); Garza v. State and County
Mut. Fire Ins. Co, No. 2-06-202-CV, 2007 WL 1168468, at *5-7 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
Apr. 19, 2007, pet. denied); Chesson, 2007 WL 1964538, at *20-26; Kupchynsky, 230 S.W.3d
at 690-91. But see Lim, 2007 WL 4180153 at *4-7; Fryar, 2007 WL 1218221 at *2-3; Jacuzzi,
Inc. v. Franklin Elec. Co., Inc., No. 3:07-CV-1090-D, 2008 WL 190319, at *4-5 (N.D. Tex.
Jan 22, 2008); Morgan Bldgs. & Spas, Inc. v. Humane Soc'y of Se. Tex., 249 S.W.3d 480, 490
(Tex. App.-Beaumont 2008, no pet.).
119. See West & Obi, supra note 3, at 901-06; West & Bodamer, supra note 3, at 116166.
120. See Heritage,375 B.R. at 265 n.50. See also Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. Swanson,
959 S.W.2d 171, 180 (Tex. 1997) (The Schlumberger court emphasized the following factors
in deciding to enforce the disclaimer clause at issue: (1) the parties were attempting to put
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dant, and debtor ("Heritage") in Heritage proposed an amended plan of
reorganization in a Chapter 11 proceeding that featured an offer to settle
a majority of the litigation then pending against Heritage, including the
fraudulent inducement action of one claimant. 12 1 In the Fifth Circuit, a
bankruptcy court may only approve such a settlement if it is "fair and
equitable and in the best interest of the estate," considering, among other
factors, the probability that the debtor defendant would have prevailed
on the merits in the relevant litigation. 122 Accordingly, the fraudulent
inducement action required the court to evaluate the strength of Heritage's defense that a merger clause in the disputed agreement barred the
123
plaintiff customer's claim as a matter of law.
Plaintiff alleged that Heritage, a developer of complex estate and tax
planning strategies for "high net-worth" individuals, falsely represented
that its schemes "[were] legal," and that the IRS had not indicated interest in, or skepticism regarding, the Heritage products, which representa12 4
tions fraudulently induced plaintiff into purchasing debtor's advice.
Heritage contended in its defense that the "waiver," ''release," "merger,"
and "reliance disclaimer" provisions of the contract between plaintiff and
25
Heritage defeated the reliance element of the plaintiff's claim.'
The bankruptcy court summarily dismissed Heritage's contention that
the various disclaimer clauses barred plaintiff's claim, concluding that the
plaintiff would likely prevail in its fraudulent inducement action under
Schlumberger.'26 The court grounded its analysis on the faulty premise
that "the general rule [in Texas is] that [merger and reliance disclaimer]
clauses ... can be avoided by proof of fraud in the inducement, and the
parol evidence rule does not bar proof of such fraud."'1 27 Consequently,
the court effectively presumed that the provisions were invalid, requiring
Heritage to "carve around this general rule" by affirmatively establishing
1 28
that the Schlumberger "exception" applied.
The bankruptcy court then argued that Texas state courts, unlike federal courts within the Fifth Circuit, "appear to require facts similar to
Schlumberger before concluding that a fraudulent inducement claim has
been contracted away" under the "exception.' 1 29 While some Texas
an end to their deal; (2) highly competent and able legal counsel represented both parties;

(3) the parties were dealing at arm's length; (4) the parties were knowledgeable and sophisticated business players; and (5) the parties signed the release in the context of an
adversarial dispute); accord Steinberg v. Brennan, No. 3:03-CV-0562, 2005 WL 1837961, at
*4 (N.D. Tex. July 29, 2005).

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Heritage, 375 B.R. at 238.
Id. at 259-60.
See id. at 263-64.
Id. at 250-51.
Id. at 263.
Id. at 263-66.
Id. (citing Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. Swanson, 959 S.W.2d 171, 179-81 (Tex.

1997)).

128. Id. at 263.
129. Id. at 264-65 (citing Coastal Bank SSB v. Chase Bank of Tex., N.A., 135 S.W.3d
840 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.)); see generally Carousel's Creamery,
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courts have improperly applied Schlumberger only in factually analogous
cases, those facts are not a pre-requisite to the enforceability of a merger
or disclaimer provision in Texas state court. 130 Indeed, less than three
weeks before Heritage, for example, the Fifth Court of Appeals in Dallas
acknowledged in ISG State Operations, Inc. v. National Heritage Insurance Co. that "nothing in the [Schlumberger] opinion suggests its analysis
is limited to settlement agreements.' 3 1 Although Schlumberger "did
spend considerable time discussing the parties' dispute and settlement,"
the court of appeals continued, "it did so in light of the requirement that
'the contract and the circumstances surrounding32its formation determine
whether the disclaimer of reliance is binding."
Having chosen the Texas courts' allegedly "narrower interpretation of
the circumstances under which a prospective reliance disclaimer is enforced," the bankruptcy court read Schlumberger to be a "fact-sensitive
ruling," and thus inferred that it was "unlikely that [Heritage] could prevail on a motion for summary judgment. 1 33 Without even considering
the relevant facts, the bankruptcy court concluded that "in light of [Heritage's] failure to refute [plaintiff's] factual contentions, relying instead on
the [waiver and disclaimer of reliance provisions] ...

it appears there is a

substantial likelihood that [plaintiff] would prevail on [its] fraudulent inducement claims .... ,,134
Ultimately, the Heritage court failed to balance the concern that enforcing merger and disclaimer clauses would encourage fraudulent inducement against the competing need to ensure that parties may "bargain
LLC v. Marble Slab Creamery, Inc., 134 S.W.3d 385 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004,
pet. dism'd by agr.); Woodlands Land Dev. Co., L.P. v. Jenkins, 48 S.W.3d 415 (Tex.
App.-Beaumont 2001, no pet.); Yzaguirre v. KCS Res., Inc., 47 S.W.3d 532 (Tex. App.Dallas 2000), affid 53 S.W.3d 368 (Tex. 2001); Fletcher v. Edwards, 26 S.W.3d 66 (Tex.
App.-Waco 2000, pet denied).
130. Steinberg v. Brennan, No. 3:03-CV-0562, 2005 WL 1837961, at *4 (N.D. Tex. July
29, 2005). See, e.g., Morgan Bldgs. & Spas., Inc. v. Humane Soc'y of Se. Tex., 249 S.W.3d
480, 490 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2008, no pet. h.); ISG State Operations, Inc. v. Nat'l Heritage Ins. Co., 234 S.W.3d 711, 721-22 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2007, pet denied); Coastal
Bank SSB, 135 S.W.3d at 843-44 (absent any reference to the specific facts of Schlumberger, the court held that "[t]he circumstances surrounding the formation of the contract
here and the nature of the disclaimers included in both the [pre-contract memorandum]
and the contract persuade us that [plaintiff's] reliance on [defendant's] statement ... was
not justified."). While the "particular constellation of facts that appeared in Schlumberger"
is not required to enforce a merger or disclaimer of reliance clause under Texas law, courts
will not likely enforce such a provision in cases where none of the relevant factors is present. See Farnham v. Electrolux Home Care Prods., Ltd., 527 F. Supp. 2d 584, 588-89
(W.D. Tex. 2007).
131. ISG, 234 S.W.3d at 721-22 (citing Coastal Bank, 135 S.W.3d at 844-45, which applied Schlumberger to resolve a dispute over a bank syndicate agreement); Ikon Office
Solutions, Inc. v. Eifert, 125 S.W.3d 113, 128 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet.
denied) (applying Schlumberger to resolve a dispute over an acquisition and employment
agreement); Woodlands, 48 S.W.3d at 420-22 (applying Schlumberger to resolve a dispute
over a real estate contract)).
132. ISG, 234 S.W.3d at 721-22 (emphasis in original).
133. Heritage, 375 B.R. at 265.
134. Id. at 266.
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for and obtain a release barring all further dispute[s].' 135 By limiting
Schlumberger to its particular facts, Heritage and the cases that it purported to follow could restrict the prospect of "walk-away deal certainty"
to settlement agreements under specific circumstances, and thereby ob-

struct the very policy that Schlumberger sought to advance. 136
While other courts applied Schlumberger to contracts other than settle-

ment agreements during this Survey period, these decisions generally required that the disputed provisions be specifically tailored and visually
prominent. 137 In Mansfield Heliflight v. Bell/Agusta Aerospace Co., for
example, the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Texas declined to enforce a merger clause that excluded extra-contractual
''representations" because the provision did "not clearly express an intent
to waive fraudulent inducement claims and [did] not expressly disclaim
reliance on representations about specific matters in dispute. ' 138 Indeed,
though the parties appeared to be sophisticated and to have bargained at
arm's length, the court limited its inquiry to the language of the merger
clause, which it construed narrowly. 139 The same court concluded in
Netknowledge Technologies, Inc. v. Rapid Transmit Technologies, Inc. that
an arbitrator did not "manifestly disregard the law" when the arbitrator

determined that a boilerplate merger clause, buried in a lengthy paragraph titled "Miscellaneous," did not bar a plaintiff's fraudulent inducement claim. 140 And the Fourth Court of Appeals in San Antonio
Properties,L.P. v. PSRA Investments, Inc. similarly refused to enforce a
merger clause that was one of eighteen unrelated agreements in a section
135. See id. at 264 (citing Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. Swanson, 959 S.W.3d 171, 179
(Tex. 1997)).
136. See id.
137. See Gen. Retail Serv., Inc. v. Wireless Toyz Franchise, LLC, F. App'x 775, 790-91
(5th Cir. 2007); Mansfield Heliflight, Inc. v. Bell/Agusta Aerospace Co., 507 F. Supp. 2d
638, 648-49 (N.D. Tex. 2007); Netknowledge Tech. v. Rapid Transmit Tech., No. 3:02-CV2406-M, 2007 WL 518548 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 2007). See also West & Obi, supra note 3, at
901-06; West & Bodamer, supra note 3, at 1161-66. It is also important that merger clauses
do not include the very extra-contractual representations that practitioners intend them to
exclude. During this Survey period, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas declined to enforce a merger clause because the provision implicitly incorporated a series of fraudulent extra-contractual representations in the "final agreement."
Therefore, the court held, the parties did not intend to preclude reliance on the fraudulent
representations under Schlumberger. See Whitney Nat'l Bank v. Air Ambulance by B&C
Flight Mgmt., Inc., No. H-04-2220, 2007 WL 3145788, at *4-7 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 25, 2007).
138. Mansfield, 507 F. Supp. 2d at 649. But see Wireless Toyz, 255 F. App'x at 791 (a
"merger clause itself does not have to explicitly mention or refer to prior representations,
so long as the entire agreement as a whole indicates that there was a clear, unequivocal
disclaimer of reliance.").
139. Mansfield, 507 F. Supp. 2d at 648-49. The facts of the case did not indicate
whether both parties were represented by counsel.
140. Netknowledge, 2007 WL 518548, at *5. See also Kupchynsky v. Nardiello, 230
S.W.3d 685, 690-91 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, pet. filed), for a similar disposition of an as-is
clause under Prudential. But see Owens v. Mercedes Benz USA, LLC, 541 F. Supp. 2d 869,
862 (N.D. Tex. 2008) (holding that a fraudulent inducement plaintiff must produce something more than a copy of the standard form contract that set forth a disputed "as-is"
provision to demonstrate that the provision is ineffective to negate causation-for example, evidence that he lacked relative sophistication).
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entitled "Buyer and Seller Agree to the following," and did not "specifion any representations regarding the
cally and expressly disclaim reliance 141
subject-matter of the [agreement].

Given the stringency of the foregoing decisions, we are pleased that the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas adopted a
broader interpretation of Schlumberger near the end of this Survey period to enforce a merger provision and separately stipulated disclaimer of
reliance. 142 In Jacuzzi, Inc. v. Franklin Electric Co., plaintiff licensor
("Jacuzzi") alleged that defendant licensee ("Franklin") fraudulently induced Jacuzzi into granting Franklin the exclusive right to promote and
sell Jacuzzi's underground water pumps by failing to disclose its plans to
develop a competing product and by misrepresenting the value of the
143
sales on which it projected Jacuzzi would receive royalty payments.
Franklin filed a motion under Federal Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss Jacuzzi's
action, maintaining that Jacuzzi had waived reliance on Franklin's extracontractual representations when it acceded to the license agreement's
merger and disclaimer clauses, set forth below:
MERGER CLAUSE (title and emphasis added):

This Agreement

supercedes (sic) all prior agreements and understandings of the [parties] regarding the Licensed Marks in the Territories and it contains
the entire understanding between the [parties] with respect thereto.
DISCLAIMER OF RELIANCE (title and emphasis added): The Parties
are relying solely on the representations made in the Agreement and
hereof by, but
not upon any representations made prior to the date 144
not limited to, any employee or agent of the Parties.
Applying Schlumberger, the district court determined that the disputed
provisions "clearly and unequivocally [waived] reliance on extrinsic representations related to anticipated sales of Jacuzzi brand pumps.

145

Un-

like the bankruptcy court in Heritage, the district court correctly
recognized that "both Texas and federal courts have applied the principles of Schlumberger to contracts other than [settlement agreements] in
holding that a disclaimer (of) reliance precludes a fraudulent inducement
claim."'146 The district court then reviewed state and federal cases enforc141. San Antonio Props., L.P. v. PSRA Invs., Inc., 255 S.W.2d 255, 262 (Tex. App.-

San Antonio 2008, pet. filed). The court also noted that the agreement "represented the
beginning of the parties' relationship and not its end" to contrast the disputed provision
from that enforced in Schlumberger. But the court did not state or indicate that Schlumberger was limited to its particular facts.
142. See Jacuzzi, Inc. v. Franklin Elec. Co., No. 3:07-CV-1090-D, 2008 WL 190319, at *4
(N.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 2008).
143. Id. at *2.
144. Id.
145. Id. at *4.
146. Id. at *3 (citing Armstrong v. Am. Home Shield Corp., 333 F.3d 566, 571 (5th Cir.
2003) (employment contract); U.S. Quest, Ltd. v. Kimmons, 228 F.3d 399, 403 (5th Cir.

2000) (consulting contract); Steinberg v. Brennan, No. 3:03-CV-0562, 2005 WL 1837961, at
*8 (N.D. Tex. 2005) (stock purchase agreement); Coastal Bank SSB v. Chase Bank of Tex.,
N.A., 135 S.W.3d 840, 845 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (acquisition

agreement)).
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ing merger provisions under Schlumberger, concluding that "disclaimers
less clear than the one contained in the License Agreement have precluded claims of fraudulent inducement" in Texas. 147 Finally, the district
court distinguished the clauses at issue in Jacuzzi from a provision in a
settlement agreement that the Fifth Circuit declined to enforce in Dunbar
Medical Systems, Inc. v. Gammex, Inc.148 Acknowledging that the "decisions of the Fifth Circuit have sometimes appeared to be inconsistent in
interpreting disclaimers of reliance," the court highlighted the fact that
the license agreement expressly referenced "reliance on representations"
and placed the reliance disclaimer "in an independent sentence, separate
1 49
from the merger clause.
The Jacuzzi court's reading of Schlumberger is consistent with the
broader enforcement of merger clauses that we observed in our 2006 and
2007 Survey articles. 150 But Jacuzzi stands out during the 2008 Survey
period as one of the few decisions that enforced a disclaimer provision.
Because Texas courts have not adopted a predictable approach to the
enforceability of merger clauses, prudent practitioners should draft these
provisions to withstand the most rigid Schlumberger test. Accordingly,
we recommend that counsel devise merger and disclaimer of reliance
clauses to survive even an egregious misreading of Schlumberger that limits the holding to that case's particular facts. 151
To that end, we offer several suggestions. First, contracting parties
should document the arm's length negotiations by which they agreed to
incorporate a merger or disclaimer provision in a contract.1 52 Second, the
contract document should stipulate the parties' sophistication as business
players and the competence of their legal counsel. 153 And third, to ensure that the provisions specifically and unequivocally disclaim reliance
147. Id. at *4 (citing Armstrong, 333 F.3d at 571; U.S. Quest Ltd., 228 F.3d at 403; Ikon,
125 S.W.3d at 125-28; Steinberg, 2005 WL 1837961, at *6).
148. Id. at *5 (citing Dunbar Med. Sys., Inc. v. Gammex, Inc., 216 F.3d 441, 448-49, 451
(5th Cir. 2000), which declined to enforce the following merger clause: "the Settlement

Agreement contains the entire agreement between the parties, and no representations,
inducements, promises or agreement, oral or otherwise between the parties with reference
thereto and not embodied herein shall be of any force" because it did not "reflect the
requisite clear and unequivocal expression of intent necessary to disclaim reliance on the
specific representations.").
149. Id. at *5. Having concluded that the license agreement "clearly and unequivocally" precluded reliance on Franklin's extra-contractual representations, the court then
determined that it could dismiss Jacuzzi's fraudulent inducement claim at the Rule 12(b)(6)
stage, explaining that "when the contract on which a plaintiff's fraudulent inducement
claim is based clearly and unequivocally disclaims reliance on extrinsic representations, the
plaintiff's claim for relief is not facially plausible when the complaint fails to allege the
factual basis for avoiding enforcement of the contract's reliance disclaimer." Because
Jacuzzi was "directly involved in the formation of the License Agreement," the court continued, "any facts necessary to circumvent the reliance disclaimer should be available to it,
without the necessity of first conducting discovery." Id. at *5.
150. See West & Obi, supra note 3, at 901-06; West & Bodamer, supra note 3, at 116166.
151. See In re Heritage Org., 375 B.R. 230, 265-66 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2007).
152. See Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. Swanson, 959 S.W.2d 171, 180 (Tex. 1997).
153. Id.
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on all prior representations, we recommend that practitioners reference,
but not replicate as boilerplate, the following "Exclusivity of Agreement"
and "Non-Reliance of Buyer" clauses:
ExCLUSIVITY OF AGREEMENT. The parties hereto have voluntarily
agreed to define their rights, liabilities, and obligations respecting the
subject matter of this Agreement exclusively in contract pursuant to
the express terms and provisions of this Agreement; and the parties
hereto expressly disclaim that they are owed any duties or are entitled to any remedies not expressly set forth in this Agreement. Furthermore, the parties each hereby acknowledge that this Agreement
embodies the justifiable expectations of sophisticated parties derived
from arm's length negotiations; all parties to this Agreement specifically acknowledge that no party has any special relationship with another party that would justify any expectation beyond that of an
ordinary buyer and an ordinary seller in an arm's length transaction.
The sole and exclusive remedies for any breach of the terms and provisions of this Agreement (including any representations and warranties set forth herein) shall be those remedies available at law or in
equity for breach of contract only (as such contractual remedies may
be further limited or excluded pursuant to the express terms of this
Agreement); and the parties hereto hereby settle, waive and release
any and all tort claims and causes of action that may be based upon,
arise out of or relate to this Agreement, or the negotiation, execution
or performance of this Agreement (including any tort claim or cause
of action based upon, arising out of or related to any representation
or warranty made in or in connection with this Agreement or as an
inducement to enter into this Agreement).
NON-RELIANCE OF BUYER.

Except for the specific representations

and warranties expressly made by the Company or any Selling Stockholder in Article __ of this Agreement, (1) Buyer acknowledges and
agrees that neither the Company nor any Selling Stockholder is making any representation or warranty, expressed or implied, at law or in
equity, in respect of the Business, the Company, the Company's Subsidiaries, or any of the Company's or its Subsidiaries' respective business, assets, liabilities, operations, prospects, or condition (financial
or otherwise), including with respect to merchantability or fitness for
any particular purpose of any assets, the nature or extent of any liabilities, the prospects of the Business, the effectiveness or the success
of any operations, or the accuracy or completeness of any confidential information memoranda, documents, projections, material or
other information (financial or otherwise) regarding the Company or
any Company Subsidiary furnished to Buyer or its representatives or
made available to Buyer and its representatives in any "data rooms,"
"virtual data rooms," management presentations or in any other
form in expectation or, or in connection with, the transactions contemplated hereby, or in respect of any other matter or thing whatsoever, (2) Buyer specifically disclaims that it is relying upon or has
relied upon any such other representations or warranties and acknowledges and agrees that the Company and the Selling Shareholders have specifically disclaimed and do hereby specifically disclaim
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any such other representation or warranty made by any Person, and
(3) Buyer is acquiring the Company on an "as is, where is" basis,
"with all faults," subject only to the specific representations and warranties set forth in Article

__

of this Agreement as further limited

by the specifically bargained-for limitations on remedies set forth in
Section

. The provisions of this Section

_,

together with the

limited remedies provided in Section -, were specifically bargained-for between Buyer, the Company, and the Selling Stockholders and were taken into account by Buyer, the Company, and the
Selling Stockholders in arriving at the Purchase Price. Buyer represents and warrants to the Selling Shareholders and the Company that
Buyer has conducted, to its satisfaction, its own independent investigation of the condition, operations and business of the Company and
its Subsidiaries and Buyer has been provided access to and an opportunity to review any and all information respecting the Company and
its Subsidiaries requested by Buyer in order for Buyer to make its
own determination to proceed with the transactions contemplated by
this Agreement and with the limited representations, warranties and
remedies specifically bargained for in Section __ 154
By undertaking these precautionary measures, practitioners can attempt to provide better "walk-away deal certainty" for their corporate
clients, and, hopefully, shield the corporation's officers from extra-contractual liability for routine conduct in arm's length commercial
negotiations.
V.

CONCLUSION
Our review of the cases decided during this Survey period reveals both
encouraging and discouraging trends with respect to the Texas judiciary's
willingness to fulfill the intentions and expectations of a corporation's investors, affiliates, directors, and officers. Indeed, while we are pleased
that the Moore and Acceptance Indemnity courts adopted cautious approaches to the "outsider" and "insider" reverse veil piercing theories
proposed in those cases, we remain concerned that the Texas Supreme
Court once again refused to clarify the legality of the precarious "single
business enterprise" theory in PHC-Minden. And while the Jacuzzi
court's enforcement of the disputed merger and disclaimer of reliance
clauses at the end of this Survey period evinced appropriate respect for
the parties' freedom to define their rights and obligations by contract, we
are troubled by the Texas courts' increasing tendency to interpret
Schlumberger as limited to its particular facts. Accordingly, we are hopeful that the 2009 Survey period will produce holdings in each of the foregoing areas of corporate law that offer more definitive guidance for
practitioners and, consequently, more certainty for their clients.

154. For similar provisions, see West & Obi, supra note 7, at 18, 20; West & Stasny,
supra note 3, at 723.
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